

Penn state took over the administration
of an Anti-Submarine Warfare Laboratory
for NATO at La Spezia, Italy

"The purpose of this lab was to share
technical information with our allies
while not disclosing our Navy's top secrets

P.163.

Received: from mira
(gcameron@mira.cc.umanitoba.ca [130.179.16.8]) by
electra.cc.umanitoba.ca (8.8.5/8.8.5) with SMTP id RAA25236
for <gcameron@cc.umanitoba.ca>; Thu, 12 Jun 1997 17:51:22 -0500 (CDT)
Sender: gcameron@cc.UManitoba.CA
Message-ID: <33A07D67.42A8@cc.umanitoba.ca>
Date: Thu, 12 Jun 1997 17:51:19 -0500
X-UIDL: 866155888.001
From: Grant Robert Cameron <gcameron@cc.UManitoba.CA>
Organization: University of Manitoba
X-Mailer: Mozilla 3.0 (X11; I; SunOS 5.5.1 sun4u)
MIME-Version: 1.0
To: gcameron@cc.UManitoba.CA
Subject: (no subject)
Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="-----32DFA5F1D32"
Status: O
X-Status:

This is a multi-part message in MIME format.

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Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit

<http://www.uscoldwar.com/Classification.html>

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Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii; name="Classification.html"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Content-Disposition: inline; filename="Classification.html"

[Image]
[Image]

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Plans | ClassificationPolicies | Example: Testing History | Example: Warhead
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HOW & WHY THIS SERIES CAME TO EXIST: U.S. POLICIES TOWARD CLASSIFICATION

Since 1945, the U.S. nuclear weapons program has included 60,000 warheads of 71 different types for 116 separate weapons systems. Another 29 designs were canceled before they reached production. By the end of 1992, the U.S. had detonated more than 1,000 nuclear explosions on the surface of the earth, underground, underwater, in the atmosphere, and in space over and under the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans, and in several states in the continental U.S.

The cost of this program has been staggering: over \$89 billion in development costs and \$700 billion for delivery systems. These nuclear warheads were fabricated by a vast administrative and materials production complex that spans the west coast from Washington to California and which ranges east across the country to the District of Columbia and south to Florida. Many thousands of persons have been and are employed by this network.

In spite of the massive size and scope of this weapons development effort, its products and activities have remained largely out of the public consciousness

creaty of 1963 which sent U.S. nuclear testing and, until just recently, most protest underground. Secrecy about the American nuclear weapons

program, while necessary up to a point, has brought many unpleasant side affects. War plans employing hundreds of nuclear bombs were drawn up by the Joint Chiefs of Staff soon after World War II at a time when the total U.S. nuclear stockpile did not contain more than a few dozen weapons. The JCS made their plans totally ignorant of the most closely-held secret in the country. Only recently, nearly 50 years later, has the Department of Energy begun to declassify and release stockpile sizes after 1948.

The country's readiness for war was hindered by nuclear secrecy: obtaining and reviewing secret and top secret clearances for employees, consultants and armed forces personnel has been a major bottleneck since the Manhattan Project of World War II. At one time soon after the end of World War II, Air Force Strategic Air Command aircrews were not cleared to even see the bombs they would be dropping, let alone service, handle, or arm them.

Aircraft manufacturers were given only the most general estimates of weights and volumes for the weapons their yet-to-be-built aircraft would carry. In his book, Ed Heinemann, retired chief designer for Douglas Aircraft, relates how in 1949 he was visited by agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation after he speculated about an atomic bomb that was considerably smaller than the five foot diameter, fifteen foot long, 10,000 lb. weapon specified for carriage by the new A3D Skywarrior, then in design.

This obsession with nuclear secrecy has bred a gross public ignorance about the origins and effects of nuclear weapons, to the point that in 1979 a sizable part of the American public was fooled into believing that a multistage hydrogen bomb could be built solely from information in a 10-page long political magazine article. To other people, nuclear weapons are little more than an abstract concept and difficult to imagine as physical hardware.

The government has always gone to extreme lengths to maintain this monopoly of information. In 1950, copies of an issue of SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN containing an article about the H-bomb by Dr. Hans Bethe were destroyed and printing plates smashed after the Atomic Energy Commission objected to a few words of text in the article. In 1967, the AEC attempted unsuccessfully to gain dominion over all privately-funded research into laser-driven fusion.

After the Department of Energy was created in 1977 and James Schlesinger was named its director, there were instances in three consecutive years when DOE suppressed or tried to suppress articles and papers by college students and a free-lance writer about hypothetical nuclear weapons designs. In these cases, the government asserted sole rights to public-domain information, even though most of it had been previously declassified and released by the Atomic Energy Commission, the Energy Research and Development Administration, and DOE itself.

Ironically, concepts at issue in 1979 were unclassified in the Soviet Union, but remained classified here until late in 1980. Before the PROGRESSIVE case, one DOE spokesman boasted that inquisitive journalists always ceased their questioning when the cover of classification was invoked. Another major effect of secrecy has been the total absence of a comprehensive unclassified technical history of the U.S. postwar nuclear weapons program. A recent three-volume AEC history is a largely administrative account that was subjected to severe censorship about the postwar weapons program.

To fill this gap, I decided to write an unclassified technical history, in the style of many books about the famous wartime Manhattan Project. In 1971, I began serious research. Four years later, I had written a 100-page monograph that summed up most of what I had learned; a portion of it appeared in 1976 in REPLICAS IN SCALE, a now-defunct Texas-based aeromodeling magazine. In 1981, I signed a contract with AEROFAX, Inc. in Dallas to produce a major work on the subject. The results were published in 1988 by Orion Books in N as U. It was

only book of its type in the U.S. and quite possibly in the world.

Since 1988, I have been extending and updating the manuscript upon which the book was based. The results to date have included almost a four-fold expansion in text volume, and a near doubling of source photos. It became apparent by 1994 that new media would be required to not only hold this massive amount of information and images, but also to allow regular updates at a reasonable cost. Hence the use of a CD-ROM and microfiche for this service. The CD-ROM version includes all text and illustrations; the fiche includes text and tables only.

See the article from the Las Vegas SUN with a report of Chuck Hansen's speech given as part of the 14th Annual Nevada Test Site Classification/Declassification Symposium on 9/17/96.

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[More Headers]

Note: John Horgan has given the bottom line here: His report is VERY RELEVANT to the UFO subject as well...rmc 97'

Lying by the Book
by John Horgan
Scientific American
October 1992
ISSN 0036-8733.

Dissembling by public officials is probably as old as government. Certainly the practice has become a tradition in Washington. During the 1950s and 1960s, for example, U.S. Army planes carried out mock biological warfare attacks against American and Canadian cities by spraying them with live -- though supposedly harmless -- bacteria. If local officials asked what was going on, the army said it was testing a radar-deflecting chaff.

One might think that such prevarication -- whether justified or not -- is done on an ad hoc, seat-of-the-pants basis. That might have been the case previously, but no more. The Bush administration has actually drafted regulations on the use of deception to provide cover for secret programs. Bureaucrats' passion for secrecy, it seems, is exceeded only by their passion for codification.

The regulations are part of the National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual, which sets forth agencies and contractors involved with classified programs. Recently the Department of Defense generated a supplement to the manual for "special access" (also called "black") programs, whose existence cannot even be acknowledged. Dated May 29, 1992, and stamped "draft," the supplement states:

"Cover stories may be established for unacknowledged programs in order to protect the integrity of the program from individuals who do not have a need to know. Cover stories must be believable and cannot reveal any information regarding the true nature of the contract. Cover stories for Special Access Programs must have the approval of the PSO [Program Security Officer] prior to dissemination."

The supplement also notes that special access programs must have "nonattributable" telephone lines, also called "Hello lines," connecting them to the outside world. Personnel who answer such a telephone must "state the proper salutation, e.g. Good Morning or Hello. Do not use the company name."

supplement public, professes to be shocked at the cover-story policy, which he calls "officially sanctioned lying." "One can see situations where this might be warranted, maybe in the midst of wartime," he says. "But this is not sufficiently well defined to convince me that it is limited. It's obviously a very dangerous practice, because it can corrupt the public discourse."

Susan Hansen, a spokesperson for the Pentagon, grumbles that the document on cover stories was confidential. "Whoever sent it to you was unauthorized," she says. She points out, furthermore, that the document is an unapproved draft version that "does not represent the policy of the federal government."

But does this statement itself represent a cover story? According to a Senate staff member specializing in security issues, the Bush administration has already implemented the cover-story policy -- with the complicity of some congressional oversight committees. Indeed, the

administration has consulted with Congress before disseminating cover stories about several "major programs" to the media, the staffer says. Such as? "Sorry, I can't tell you that," he replies.

The staff member emphasizes that Congress, although it gives its approval to cover stories when the need for security seems clear, does not actively participate in the deception. Indeed, Congress is trying to reduce the need for such deception by cutting the number of black programs to a minimum. "It's a very uncomfortable situation in the democratic framework to lie about what you're doing," he acknowledges.

[Image]

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Legends and history abound in stories of visits to this earth by beings from the sky; beings which came in strange craft capable of the most extraordinary performance, and who themselves possessed great powers or had at their command strange forces, much beyond the understanding of the simple folk who witnessed these things. There is much evidence that this has gone on all through the ages, and is going on right now. With excellent news gathering and dissemination means at our disposal, very little happens anywhere in the world which is not reported, and, if it is of sufficient interest, gets wide publicity. During the last ten years or more there has been much publicity about "Flying Saucers" and thousands of reports have been made of sightings of these strange objects in our skies. But this is not an exclusively recent phenomenon; only the publicity is recent. Ever since we have had newspapers there have been similar reports, but the absence of news services until recent times usually confined the details to a few local papers, and searches of old newspapers files confirm that flying saucers are old stuff.

The tense international situation in recent years has made everyone jittery and anything in the skies which could not be established as known and friendly was regarded with suspicion. Consequently, procedures, projects, and publicity combined to make the whole subject of flying saucers appear quite out of perspective. Instead of recognizing them for what they probably really were, they became a ward of the Military, and since the Military are charged only with the defence of a country, their interests waned when they had established the fact that the saucers apparently were not hostile. But in order to arrive at this conclusion they collected much data, classified it, and buried it so effectively that no one else could get at it, and those who might have been able to sort the matter out found themselves deprived of the basic data and had to content themselves with the bit which escaped the clutches of the Military. However, on the basis of this material some rather startling conclusions have been reached.

Thousands of people have seen lights and apparently solid objects in the sky which behaved as no light or object normally seen in the sky ought to behave. Thousands have seen these objects under circumstances which enabled them to say definitely what they were not, even though they were unable to say what they were. Reliable photographs and movies have been taken, and bits of "hardware" collected which cannot be explained away without challenging the integrity of many witnesses. Simultaneous visual sightings and radar fixes exist in a great many cases, and there is quite a bit of evidence of physical contact with these strange craft.

In several instances reliable people have reported seeing the beings who ride about on these craft, and they say they look just like us. There are quite a number of reported contacts between these people from "elsewhere" and people of this earth, and although this latter point may be hard to prove it is equally hard to disprove, and the results of these contacts are remarkably consistent and enlightening. At the present time there are quite a number of books, magazines and bulletins devoted to the study of flying saucers, and anyone who wishes to establish for himself the validity of these things will find no dearth of material.

UFOs and GOVERNMENTAL SECRECY

At one time, along with many others, it was my opinion that it was the Air Force who were withholding the true facts about the UFOs. However, as a result of later developments, I no longer adhere to that conviction. One of the principal factors in my change of opinion was a conversation with the late Wilbert B. Smith, approximately two years before he passed away. During the course of this conversation, I asked Mr. Smith whether it was the Air Force or some other department of government that was keeping UFO information from the public. Mr. Smith replied that it was not the Air Force but "a small group very high up in the government." Upon further questioning, Mr. Smith refused to identify the group to which he had reference, and quickly led the conversation into other channels.

Dr. Raymond Bernard: The Hollow Earth (New York: Fieldcrest Publishing Co., 1964), unpagged preface. The above paragraph occurs in a three-page essay which, for no very apparent reason, precedes Bernard's work. The essay is unsigned, but is evidently by C. W. Fitch. The writer refers to Edwards as a long-time acquaintance, and the interview with Smith indicated above is undoubtedly the one recorded in Flying Saucers -- Serious Business. In The Hollow Earth Bernard mentions a Theodore Fitch as the author of Our Paradise Inside the Earth. In addition to a subterranean world inhabited by a superior race, Bernard believes in vegetarianism and human reproduction by parthenogenesis.

FOUR YEARS AT NSA - NO UFOs
By Thomas P. Deuley

Mr. Deuley is a retired Naval officer formerly employed in communications security by the National Security Agency. Address: 9115 Autumn Storm, San Antonio, TX 78250

This paper is intended to clear the air, to some degree, on the unreleased NSA documents. The author worked at NSA during the entire Freedom of Information Act proceedings and believes he had most of the documents under contention in accumulated files. The stage is first set for what can be said about the papers by describing the policy that prevents the author from entering into broad discussions about the contested papers. Also presented, as background, is general information about the people and attitudes found at NSA, including the unintentional development of an information network. The author's experience shows that there are people in the Government who are interested in genuine UFO hard evidence and that such hard evidence could quickly be moved to the highest levels. Two examples are given to support this perception.

The author makes apparent that he and others pursued their avocation of UFOs unhampered by Government harassment, and suggests that the Government does not mind having some level of UFO expertise present. Though the contents of the documents is not revealed, a general picture is given of their substance. Secondly, but importantly, the author outlines what the documents do not contain. In addition, and with disappointment, it is pointed out that no follow-up was seen on what may have been interesting UFO cases. Finally, an opinion is given about the overall collection of documents and why they were not released to the public. Also mentioned is the probable disposition of the documents accumulated by the author while at NSA.

As regards the position in Canada, the Official Secrets Act, specifically Section XIV, as you mentioned in your telegram of 10 May '51, set seven years or \$2,000. as a punishment for a breach of that Act. However, it now appears that this Act was amended in 1950 and that the penalty is now up to fourteen years. As a result it appears that the penalty for sabotage, if it should remain at seven years, would be out of line with penalties in the Official Secrets Act; also I understand that under the Amendment as presently proposed, this penalty for sabotage will remain the same in Canada during wartime as in peacetime.

In consequence of all this new information I think you may wish to review the situation with Cabinet on its merits. In this connection I fully agree with you that the decision is one to be taken by the Government of Canada and we will communicate it in due course to the United States authorities. Certainly I would not like to ask their acquiescence in advance.

Yours sincerely,


A. G. L. McNaughton
Chairman
Canadian Section, PJBD

TOP SECRET

Mr. Alley

NLT-014 -381

23 APR 1949

My dear Mr. Alexander:

I wish to reply to that portion of your recent letter to Mr. Forrestal which referred to the disclosure of military information to third parties.

In accordance with the suggestion made in paragraph 2(b) of your letter, I wish to express my agreement with your proposal that teams representing our respective Governments be designated to discuss the problem of disclosure of military information to third parties. In consultation with the Secretary of State, I am designating the U. S. Team, which will be composed of officers or officials from the Departments of State, Army, Navy and Air Force and the Research and Development Board.

XXI-C-3

I hope, therefore, that you will arrange for the British Joint Services Mission in Washington to be briefed to enable them to discuss this problem with the U. S. Team.

Sincerely yours,

Louis Johnson

LOUIS JOHNSON

The Right Honorable A. V. Alexander
British Minister of Defence
London, England

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
23 APR 1949

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~~DISPATCH 4 11 49~~

cc: Honorable Dean Rusk
Chairman of SANACC
Major General Alfred M.
Gruenther, JCS

RBlum:oc
21 Apr 1949
3C746, OSD Ext 5223



Authority ADMP 17-1
 By CE NARA Date 6/2/98

CONFIDENTIAL
SECURITY INFORMATION

THE WHITE HOUSE
 WASHINGTON

May 25, 1953

To the Heads of all Departments and Agencies:

Subject: Making classified security information available to foreign nationals.

1. I shall henceforth hold responsible the head of each department and agency in the Executive Branch for insuring that United States classified security information is made available to foreign nationals only under the following conditions:

- a. On a real need-to-know basis.
- b. After determination that the furnishing of such information will result in a net advantage to the interests of the United States.

2. Except in the case of necessary conversations with high-ranking foreign civilian and military personnel, appropriate security checks will be made, to the extent feasible, with respect to prospective recipients of security information classified "secret" or higher, and

- a. The results of such security checks and the fact of the release of such security information will be made a matter of official record in the files of the department or agency releasing such information.
- b. Derogatory information derived from such security checks will be recorded in the files of the security office of the department or agency concerned and will be made available to the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Central Intelligence Agency.

3. The above conditions shall be considered minimum in character.

4. I deem that strict adherence to the spirit and letter of this directive is of the greatest importance to the national security. Consequently, I request that the head of each department and agency in the Executive Branch personally acknowledge to me the receipt of this directive.

Dwight D. Eisenhower

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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May 25, 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE:

On the recommendation of the National Security Council, I have issued to the heads of all departments and agencies in the Executive Branch the attached directive, dated today and entitled "Making classified security information available to foreign nationals."

As I have indicated in the directive, I deem strict adherence to its spirit and letter of the greatest importance to the national security.

Dwight D. Eisenhower

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SecDef Cont. No. 03753

NS/250

DECLASSIFIED	
Authority	AWM/12/1/8
By	CE NARA Date 6/2/85

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

SECRET
Security Information

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 25, 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

In the case of certain security agencies of the Government, i.e., CIA, FBI, and the intelligence agencies of the Military Services, paragraph 1a of the memorandum, dated May 25, 1953, entitled "Making classified security information available to foreign nationals", may be waived in connection with the passage of information incident to operations which the above security agencies determine to be of net advantage to the United States.

Wright

SECRET
Security Information

- June 9, 52 Sylant
- SHAPE Supreme Headquarters, Allied Air Powers, Europe
- Wright dealt with Perquim White, IRDB Intimate Member
State - Defense MIC (legation)

Foreign National Accredited to DRB as of 22 May 1950.

UK

Coppock S.W.

Lea-Wilson C.P.

Hutcheson - Smith P.B.N

CAN.

Wright, Armand L.

MAY 16, 1950

DRAFT #2 P. WHITE

" that documents shall be the rule and withholding
of information be the exception "

See. of Staff Memo. 2 Feb, 1950 from Prof

598. Folder 4

etc atomic energy

cryptanalysis

communications intelligence

secret intelligence

western intelligence matters in general

Authorized "up to and including Top Secret "

RRB to accredited can release "permissible to
show classified documents to the accredited individual
and talk about them, and it is permissible to disclose to
him the existence of the document."

document to Prof. Requirement Branch

(March, 53)

Brig Harold E. Taber replaces Wright 11 May, 53
Wright goes to Deputy Defense Research member

Reviews

NND 857020 RG # 330 Entry # 341: 1947-53.

Box 106.

file Desig

State Box 2867 WRIGHT.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 857021
By WBJ NARA Date 7/1/98

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DRAFT
11 June 1952

RDB 120/4

RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT BOARD
Washington 25, D. C.

Release of Classified
Research and Development Board Documents
to Canada and the United Kingdom

1. The responsibility of the Research and Development Board
". . . to advise the Secretary of Defense as to the status of scientific
research relative to the national security, and to assist him in assuring
adequate provision for research and development on scientific problems
relating to the national security," requires that the best possible
information on military research and development programs of Canada and
the United Kingdom be available to the Board. The Board considers that
the common interests of all three nations will be served through the
type of exchange of information called for between the United States and
the United Kingdom by the Burns-Templer Agreement, which states: ". . .
there should be a full and frank interchange to the greatest practicable
degree of all classified military information and intelligence, except in
a limited number of declared fields . . .".

2. The Board's position is based on the urgent necessity for the
fullest exploitation of scientific and technological knowledge in the
development of weapons for modern warfare. Our national resources do
not permit us to pursue all the lines of endeavor that appear desirable.
We must select the areas or problems where the need for improvement and

RDB 120/4

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the promise of effective results are greatest, and concentrate on them. A similar situation exists in both Canada and the United Kingdom. Each of the three nations can better plan for the most effective use of its scientific and technological resources, in the common military interest, if it has general knowledge of the research and development planning of the others.

3. In some areas of research and development, detailed technical information is being exchanged between the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom. The benefits of this exchange are great; however, optimum results from the total efforts of the three nations together require that the Research and Development Board and its counterparts in the other two nations be acquainted with each other's/aims and planning.

4. For these reasons the Research and Development Board believes that it should exchange top-level planning and summary documents in the field of military research and development with Canada and the United Kingdom. Such documents do not ordinarily deal with the technical details of each project or with the scientific approach to each problem, but rather with the general planning of the total program, the directions in which it is intended to move, the present status, and the anticipated over-all results. In the United States the most significant documents of this character are the Planning Guide, the Program Guidance, and the Technical Estimates. Before release, editing will usually be necessary

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to remove material specified as non-releasable in MIC 206/29.

5. Previous issued of the Master Plan (now the Planning Guide) and the Consolidated Technical Estimates have been released to Canada and the United Kingdom. In turn, the Research and Development Board has received the annual Review published by the Defence Research Policy Committee of the United Kingdom, and full summaries of the Canadian program. Information in these documents substantially corresponds to that in the above United States documents.

6. The documents in question are of the catalogue or program type. They present a totality of information that makes them especially sensitive from a security standpoint. For that reason the Research and Development Board considers that they should be designated for use only by the Defence Research Board of Canada and the Defence Research Policy Committee of the United Kingdom, with the proviso that they should not be reproduced.

7. Specifically, the Research and Development Board considers it desirable, as a matter of importance to the military research and development efforts of the United States, that the Chairman of the RDB exchange the documents described, on the basis discussed above, for corresponding information from Canada and the United Kingdom.

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By WBJD NARA Date 7/1/98

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Notes on Use of Classification System

In using the Classification System it should be noted that:

(1) To avoid repetition, the underscored wording listed in the first technical objective or subdivision of each category is not repeated in subsequent ones. For a full statement, each objective or subdivision should be preceded by the underscored phrase.

(2) The term "aircraft," as used throughout the Classification System, is considered to include the complete aircraft, its power plant, and all built-in components except those for armament, fire control, bomb direction, photography, navigation, communications, search, and electronic counter-measures. Also included are the installation provisions and modifications for installation of other components.

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The following definitions of the five priority levels, 1A, 1B, 1C, 2, 3, are based on the above referenced definitions, with certain changes in phraseology to achieve uniformity.

Priority 1 Classification

This priority will designate projects which are intended to result in items, techniques, or technical knowledge necessary for the security of the Nation or mandatory for the successful accomplishment of important assigned missions of the using agencies. Priority 1 projects are subclassified as follows:

1-A - Projects intended to produce items, techniques, or technical knowledge designed to meet a potential threat against this nation, the lack of which items or techniques might result in national destruction and disaster in the event of war.

1-B - Projects required for new tactical concepts of warfare or for new concepts of warfare resulting from new items, techniques, or technical knowledge obtained through scientific advancements which will, in the event of war, facilitate achievement of an early victory.

1-C - Projects intended to produce items, techniques, or technical knowledge, the lack of which would prevent the timely accomplishment of important assigned missions of the using agencies.

Priority 2 Classification

This priority will be assigned to those projects which are intended to produce items, techniques, or technical knowledge which will increase materially the efficiency of the armed forces or which may possess such marked superiority over existing items that complete or extensive replacements would be justified.

Priority 3 Classification

This priority will include all other projects whose inclusion in the over-all research and development program is justified. In general, projects intended to improve existing materiel and techniques which are not urgently needed, or the urgency and importance of which cannot immediately be determined, will initially be placed in this category.